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*JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT [UTAH COURT OF APPEALS^
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to its own
rules and case authority as follows:
Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (UT 1977)]
Gilroy v Lowe 626 P.2d 469 (UT 1981)1
Rule 3 "Appeals as of Right; How Taken11
Rule 4 "Appeals as of Right; When Taken"
Rule 22 "Computation and Enlargement of Time"
*Rule 35 "Petition for Re-Hearing"
"...(a)
Time For Filing; Answer; Oral Argument
Not Permitted...A rehearing will not be granted in the
absence of a petition for rehearing. A matter may not
be reheard by the Court en banc. A petition for rehearing
may be filed with the Clerk within~""l4 days after the entry
of the decision of the Court of Appeals, unless the
time is shortened or enlarged by order. The petition
shall state with particularity the points of law or
fact which the petitioner claims the Court has overlooked
or misapprehended and shall contain such argument in
support of the petition as the petitioner so desires.
Counsel for the petitioner must certify that the
petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
Oral argument in support of the petition will not be
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will
- be received unless requested by the Court...."
Rule 36 "Remittitur"
U.R.C.P. Rule 6(a) [Time-Computation]
This Petition For F.e-Hearing of Order of Dismissal is based
upon misapprehension of the facts and the law, same having not
been pointed out to the court b]/ the defendant/respondent, and
said law being contrary to the Motion For Dismissal and directly
on point.
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition For Re-Hearing on Order of Dismissal of the court
entered 3/31/88 based upon Rules of Utah Court of Appeals 4(a) and
U.R.C.P. R.ule 58A(d) neither of which are determinative of the
motion and counsel for defendant/respondent having not pointed out
to the court that there is case law directly on the point and
which is controlling including but not limited to authority as
follows:
Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (UT 1977)1
Gilroy v Lowe 626 P.2d 469 (UT 1981)1

j

Rule 22 "Computation and Enlargement of Time"
1

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Appeal was timely filed pursuant to statutory provisions and
case law interpreting time for filing and computation of time.
i

RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks a re-hearing on Order of Dismissal
and that same be recinded based upon a misapprehension of the law
i

as set out by the Utah Supreme Court with regards to computation
of time for filing of appeal.
i

(
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[STATEMENT OF THE CASE!
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
(Rule 35 [Petition For Re-Hearing])
(Rule 27(a) [Form of Petition])
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff/Appellant by and through
his Attorney of Record, Steven Lee Payton, and hereby petitions
the court for re-hearing on dismissal order [untimely appeal]
3/31/88 the court having overlooked or misapprehended points of
law from the Supreme Court of Utah upon the specific issue herein
and pursuant to said decisions plaintiff/appellants appeal is
timely.

[Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (UT 1977)]
[R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 22 "Computation of Time"]

Timeliness of Petition
Furthermore said petition for re-hearing is filed pursuant to
R. Ut. Ct. App, Rule 35 "Petition For Re-Hearing" within fourteen
(14) days after entry of decision of the court March 31, 1988
Order of Dismissal [Untimely Appeal].
Petition In Good Faith
Counsel for plaintiff/appellant certifies that this petition
is presented in good faith, not for delay, and is based upon case
law set out herein.
Defendant/Respondent Motion
Defendant/Respondents motion for dismissal of appeal cited no
authority and was not in proper form pursuant to requirements of
the Utah Court of Appeals Rules, applicable as follows:
F.ule 10 "Motion For Summary Disposition"
Rule 23 "Motions-Contentfr^^
Rule 27 "Motions-Form11
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Request For Oral Argument
Oral argument is requested herein however allowable only in
the discretion of the court pursuant to R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 2
Suspension of Rules'1 it being in the interest of justice herein
and it appearing that the court has misapprehended the law.
P.ules of Professional Responsibility

{

Further defendant/respondent failed to disclose adverse case
authority contrary to the motion [Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 3.3 MCandor Toward The Tribunal [Effective January 1, 1988].
Rule 3.3

,

,y

Candor Toward The Tribunal"

ff

. . . (a)

A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY:

(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel....11
Comment:

\

MISLEADING LEGAL ARGUMENT
i

"...Legal argument based on a knowingly false
representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward a
tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested
exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of
pertinent legal authorities" Furthermore, as stated in
paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty to disclose
directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction
which has not been disclosed by the opposing party...."
(Emphasis Added)

1

i

i
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Date

Description

01/26/88 (Tues.)
[Addendum 1]

James S. Sawaya, Third District Court
Judge signed n0rder Declining
Jurisdiction" in a case that had
previously been heard in Utah and
pending since 1982 and in which the
divorce was granted in the state of Utah
and where parties resided.

01/26/88 (Tues.)
[Addendum 2,3]

Order filed in Clerks Office 3rd D/C
SLCo.

01/26/88 (Tues.)
[Postmarked 1/27/88]
[Addendum 5^

Notice of decision was given to all
parties by minute entry however
plaintiff/appellants appeal is still
timely herein.

02/26/88 (Fri.)
[Addendum 3,4]

Plaintiff/Appellant herein filed an
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals,
copy attached.

02/26/88 (Fri.)
[Addendum 8]

Bond on Appeal [Receipt #20032]

03/08/88 (Tues.)
[Addendum 1-4]

Counsel for defendant/respondent filed a
Motion For Dismissal of Appeal, copy of
which is attached.

03/31/88 (Thurs.)
[Addendum 6,7]

Court entered an Order of Dismissal based
upon the fact that the appeal was
untimely under R. Utah Ct. App. 4A and
U.R.C.P*. Rule 58A(d) .

04/13/88 (Wed.)

Plaintiff/appellant files a Petition For
Re-Hearing for reason that the court
ruling is contrary to the law of the
Supreme Court regarding calculation of
time.
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LIST OF EXHIBITS
ADDENDUM
Description

##

Defendant/Respondent "Motion For Dismissal of Appeal"
[Untimely Appeal] 3/8/88 David S. Dolowitz, Esq.

1-4

Order Declining Jurisdiction Civil #D-82-2587
Judge, James S. Sawaya Filed 1/26/88 3rd D/C SLCo.

2-3

Minute Entry Notice of Decision Postmarked 1/27/88

5

Plaintiff/Appellant Notice of Appeal Civil #D-82-2587
3rd D/C SLCo., Judge, James S. Sawaya Filed 2/26/88

3-4

Utah Court of Appeals Order of Dismissal 3/31/88
[Untimely appeal] Honorable Regnal W. Garff, For
The Court

6-7

Receipt #20032 Salt Lake County Clerk $300 Cost Bond
Hofeling v Hofeling (Witowski) Civil #D-82-2587
Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (TJT 1977)
Gilrov v Lowe 626 P.2d 469 (UT 1981)

8
9-10
11-13
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. MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITY
(Rule 23(3) "Motions" [Rules Utah Court of Appeals]
[All motions shall be accompanied by a brief
statement of points and authorities]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED PURSUANT TO STATTJTORY
PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW INTERPRETING TIME FOR
FILING AND COMPUTATION OF TIME.
TIME FOR APPEAL
COMPUTATION OF TIME
CASE INTERPRETATIONS
COMMENTARY
CONCLUSION

8
9
10
11-15
15
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POINT
APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED PURSUANT TO STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW INTERPRETING TIME FOR
FILING AND COMPUTATION OF TIME.
TIME FOR APPEAL
Jurisdiction Court of Appeals
U.C.A. 78-?a-3 TtCourt of Appeals Jurisdiction
[Effective January 1, 1988T
"...(2)
The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over:

<

11

(g)...[Alppeals from district court involving domestic
relations cases including, but not limited to, divorce
annulment, property division, child custody, support
and visitation, adoption, and paternity....11
Utah Court of Appeals Rules
Rule 3(a) MAppeals as of Right; How Taken'1
ff

...(a)
Filing appeal from final orders and
judgments. As defined and provided by law, an appeal
may be taken from the final orders and judgments of a
district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the
Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the
clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is
taken within the time allowed by Foile 4~ Failure of an
appellant to take any step other than the timely filing
of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of
the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as the
Court of Appeals deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of
dismissal, as well as the award of attorneys fees....11

\

i

i

Rule 4 MAppeals as of Right: When TakenM
"...(a)
Appeal From Final Judgment and Order.
In a
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right
from the district court, juvenile court, or circuit court
to the Court of Appeals, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with"~the clerk of the court from
which the appeal is taken within 30 days after the date
of entry of the judgment or order appealed from...."
(Emphasis AddecH

<

4
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COMPUTATION OF TIME
R. Utah Ct. App. Rule 22 "Computation and Enlargement of TimeM
"...In computing any period of time prescribed by
these rules, by an order of the court, or by any applicable
statute the day of the act, event, or default from which
the designated period of time begins to run shall not
be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period extends until
the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday,
or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed
or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded
in the computation. As used in this rule, "legal
holiday" includes days designated as holidays by the state
and federal governments ...." (Emphasis Added)
U.R.C.P. Rule 6 [Time]
"...(a)
Computation
In computing any period of
time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local
rules of any district court, by order of court, or by
any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or
default from which the designated period of time begins
to run shall not be included^ The last day of the period
so computed shall be included unless it is a Saturday,
a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period
runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday,
a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days intermediate
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded
in the computation...."
(Emphasis Added)
U.C.A. 68-3-7 "Time How Computed"
"...The time in which any act provided by law is to
be done is computed by excluding the first day and including
the last, unless the last is a holiday, and then it also
~"
is excluded. . . . "
(Emphasis AddecTj
U.C.A. 78-27-19 "By Law Defined"
"...Wherever in this Code the term "by law" is
used with reference to any act or thing done or to be
done, such term shall refer to all statutes in effect
as well as the Rules of Civil Procedure or other court
rules and any decision of the Supreme Court interpreting
the same. . . .ff (Emphasis Added!
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*CASE INTERPRETATIONS
Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (UT 1977)
"...@pg 162...Defendant asserts that the appeal
should be dismissed as not being timely and in support
thereof points out the order appealed from was entered
October 28, 1976, and that the notice of appeal was filed
on November 29, 1976, more than one month after entry of
said order. Rule 6(a) U.R.C.P. is dispositive of this
point in providing for the computation of time that the
day of the act, event, or default after which the
designated period of time begins to run is not Included.
Also, if the last day of the period falls on Sunday it~
is not included and such was the case here. Consequently
the appeal was timely filed.../1 (Emphasis Added)
"~
Gilroy v Lowe 626 P.2d 469 (UT 1981)
fl

...@pg 471.. .The method of computing time periods
relating to acts provided for by law is set out in
Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and §§6ff-3-7 and
8, U.C.A. 1953, as amendecH When the time period is
measured in months or years from a certain date, the day
from which the time period is to run is excluded and the
same calendar date of the final month or year is included
See Albrecht v Uranium Services, Inc. Utah, 596 P. 2d 1025
(1979). Furthermore even if the limitations period
expired on October 21, 1979, that date was a Sunday and
the time period extended, until the end of the next day
See Nelson v Jorgenson, 66 Utah 360, 242 P 945 (1926).
The execution sale on October 22, 1979 was timely, as
was properly found by the trial court...."
(Emphasis Added)
-COPIES OF BOTH CASES ARE INCLUDED IN THEIR ENTIRETY
IN ADDENDUM. Page 9^TS
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COMMENTARY
Tuesday, March 8, 1988 counsel for defendant/respondent filed
with the Utah Court of Appeals a Motion For Dismissal of Appeal,
grounds and basis for which were that the plaintiff/appellants
appeal was not timely filed for reason that the Order appealed
from was entered January 26, 1988 and the Notice of Appeal was
filed February 26, 1988, it being the assertion of the
defendant/respondent that that is 31 days after entry of the trial
court Order from which appeal is taken.

The motion further

alleged that plaintiff/appellants appeal was contrary to R. Ut,
Ct. App. Rule 4(a) which provides as follows:
Rule 4 "Appeals as of Right: When TakenTt
"...(a)
Appeal From Final Judgment and Order.
In a
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right
from the district court, juvenile court, or circuit court
to the Court of Appeals, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with"""the clerk of the court from
which the appeal is taken within '30 days after the date
of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.,,,"
(Emphasis Added)
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Defendant/respondent cited no case authority and furthermore
did not cite to the court its own rules nor case authority of the
Utah Supreme Court contrary to defendant/respondents motion as
follows:
R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 22(a) Computation of Time"
"...(a)
Computation of Time.
In computing any
period of time prescribed by these rules, by an order
of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of
the act, event, or default from which the designated
period of time begins to run shall not be included. The
last day of the period shall be included, unless it is
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which
event the period extends until the end of the next day
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday.
When the period of time prescribed or allowed, is less
than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes days
designated as holidays by the state and federal
governments...." (Emphasis Added)

<

<

R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 3 "Appeals as of Right; How Taken"
R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 4 "Appeals as of Right; When Taken"

Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 (UT 1977)

<

Gilroy v Lowe 616 P.2d 469 (UT 1981)
Plaintiff/appellant had 30 days from the date the order was
entered [Tuesday, January 26, 1988] in which to file an appeal.

i
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Based upon the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court as set out herein Glad, supra,
p.10 computation of time in this case must exclude Tuesday,
January 26, 1988 that being the date that the order was entered as
appearing from the face thereof [Addendum Exhibit 2-3] . Janua^
27, 1988 would then be the first day and the 30th day would be
Friday, February 26, 1988. Calendar is set out herein for
purposes of the court examining the dates.
JANUARY 1988
S

M

T

W

TH

F

S

3
10
17
24
31

4
11
18
25

5
12
19
26

6
13
20
27

7
14
21
28

1
8
15
22
29

2
9
16
2.3
30

FEBRUARY 1988
M

T

W

TH

F

S

1
8
15
22
29

2
9
16
23

3
10
17
24

4
11
18
25

5
12
19
26

6
13
20
27

Based upon the courts own rules for computing time as well as
court decisions, excluding the first day and including the last
pursuant to R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 22 "Computation and Enlargement
of Time" the plaintiff/appellants appeal was timely filed.
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This same issue was raised in the case of Glad v Glad 567
P.2d 160 (UT 1977) and Gilroy v Lowe 616 P.2d 469 (UT 1981) and
the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the provisions for computation
of time as has the plaintiff/appellant herein that being that one
excludes the first day on which order is filed with the clerk.
Defendant/Respondent was under a duty to advise the Court of
Appeals in the Motion To Dismiss of the cases interpreting
computation of times since Glad v Glad, supra, specifically

<

involves a domestic relations case as is the case on appeal
herein.

Failure to so advise the court of this case and facts
1

amounted to misleading the court.
Defendant/Respondents computation of time purportedly
representing that it is based upon R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 4(a) would
be correct as being 31 days only if one counts January 26, 1988,
the date that the order was entered in the clerks office.

i

It is

clear however that the Utah Supreme Court by case law as well as
Utah Court of Appeals Rules [R. Ut. Ct. App. Rule 22 Computation

(

of Time"] specify that the first day is excluded from the period
of time therefore plaintiff/appellants appeal was timely.
i

i
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Further authority contrary to the defendant/respondents
assertion can be found as follows:
Federal Court of Appeals Manual [Manual of Practice
In The United States Court of Appeals] David G. Knibb
West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota 1981
,"...@pg 57 Chapter 5 Section 5.3...The appeal
period in a civil case is thirty days. In a criminal
case it is ten. Day one is the first day after entry
of the order or judgment from which the appeal is to be
taken, and day tKirty (in a civil appeal) is the last
day to file ttie notice of appeal. If the last day falls
on a weekend or legal holiday, as defined in F.R.A.P.
Rule 26(a), the period extends to the end of the next
regular business day. This applies even if the last
day is a Saturday and the clerks office is open. The
desperate can still meet the deadline after the clerks
office has closed on the last day by personally
delivering the notice to the clerk, together with the
prescribed filing fee....n (Emphasis Added)
Conclusion
Based upon statutory provisions and case law regarding
computation of time the appeal herein was timely.

The

defendant/respondent did not point out the existing case law and
interpretations of statutes under computation of time and
accordingly and therefore the Utah Court of Appeals misapprehended
the case law herein.

Plaintiff/appellant is entitled to have the

Order of Dismissal recinded and his appeal reinstated so that the
appeal may progress in its normal course and he requests such
relief.
DATED this t^

day of

Stafaefo Lee Piston
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

ADDENDUM

)

)

when, as a jurisdictional requirement, the appeal wae required,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-1008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666

Utah Court of Appeals to be filed within thirty (30) days from
the entry of the Order from which the appeal is taken.
DATED this

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ff

day of March, 1988.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH

£)

*****
BLAINE THOMAS HOFELING,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
LAURA CATHERINE
WITOWSKI,

)
)
)
)

(HOFELING)

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILINQ

MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
OF APPEAL

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a
true copy of the above and foregoing Motion for Dismissal of

C i v i l No. D 8 2 - 2 5 8 7
J u d g e J a m e s S. S a w a y a

Appeal, this
__2

)

Respondent, Laura Catherine (Hofeling) Witowski,
hereby moves the above-entitled court to dismiss the appeal of
the plaintiff /appellant on the grounds that it is not timely
The Order Declining Jurisdiction from which the

appeal is taken was filed and entered on January 26, 1988 (see
Exhibit
matter

"A"
was

attached
filed

on

hereto);
February

the Notice
26,

1988,

of Appeal
(see

in this

Exhibit

u

B"

attached hereto); that is 31 days after the entry of the Order

H-

y

of

March, 1988, to:

Mr. Steven Lee Payton
Attorney at Law
431 South 300 East, Suite 40
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

* * * * *

filed, to-wit:

da

)
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OFFICE
FILED IN CLERK'S OF
Salt L3ke County. U tah

JAN 2 G 1988
Hi DUo* Hmdl&y. Clork 3rd D,<si Court
By N b . y v i 1 . " > ^ ^

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Esq. (0899)
of and for
COHNE, R A P P A P O R T & SEGAL
Attorneys for Defendant
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone:
(801) 532-2666

advised

in

defendant

the

premises,

the

Court

has

and minor children of the parties

determined
moved

that

from the

the
State

of Utah and have resided in the State of Florida since September 1,
1964,

that

the Courts

of the State of Florida have determined

the action entitled Laura Catherine Hofeling (Witowski),
vs.

in

Petitioner

Blaine Thomas Hofeling, Respondent, Circuit Civil No. 87-6371-

IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
20,

in

the

Circuit

Court

in

and

for

Pinellis

County,

State

of

STATE OF UTAH
Florida,

Judge

John

S.

Andrews

presiding,

that

it should

assume

jurisdiction over the custody and visitation issues in this matter
BLAINE THOMAS

HOFELING,
pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody

ORDER DECLINING
JURISDICTION

Plaintiff,

tion Act and,

accordingly,

the Florida Courts

Jurisdic-

are a more

conven-

vs.
ient
LAURA CATHERINE
WITOWSKI,

(HOFELING)

forum

Section

Civil No. D82-2587
Judge James S. Sawaya

this

78-45(c)-7,

exercise

Defendant.

and

Court
Utah

jurisdiction

jurisdiction

of

these

should,
Code

pursuant

Annotated

over

the

children

and

to the

(1987

questions
allow

that

provisions

Rep.),
of

decline

custody

matter

of
to
and

to proc: vd

before the Courts of the State of Florida.
The above-entitled
1987,

the

Honorable

James

S.

Accordingly,

came before the Court on December 7,
Sawaya

presiding,

for

consideration

that

this

of the M o t i o n of the Defendant to Decline Jurisdiction Over Issue

custody

of Custody and Visitation of Children.

referenced

The Plaintiff was

in person, represented by counsel Steven Lee Payton.
was represented by counsel David S. Dclowitz.
considered
anJ

the arguments

considered

determined

to

the
take

and representations

records,
the

files

matter

and

under

papers

present

The Defendant

The Court heard and
of counsel,
in

this

advisement.

examined

matter
After

Court

and

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

declines

visitation

of

jurisdiction
the

minor

the

children

questions
in

the

matter to enable the Circuit Court of Pinellis

of

aboveCounty,

State of Florida to resolve those questions in the action entitled
Laura Catherine
Hof el ing.

Hofeling

fWitowski).

Petitioner vs. Dlaine Thomas

Respondent, Circuit Civil No.

and

being
- 2 -

£/ A

over

Lv.CrLz.:.

87-637 1-20.
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DATED

this

"3/
</'*•

y/fMit/^ty
day

STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554)
Attorney for Plaintiff
431 South 300 E a s t , Suite 40
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Telephone:
(801) 363-7070
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WITOWSKI,

Civil
(Judge,
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James S. Sav/aya)

Defendant/Respondent.
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Authority
R. Utah Ct. App. Rule 3 [Appeal As Of Right; How Taken]
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R. Utah Ct. App. Rule 4 [Appeal As Of Right: When Taken]
U.C.A. 78-2a-3(g) [Court of Appeals Jurisdiction]
TBffective January 1, 1988]
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Relations Cases
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I Notice of Appeal
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A F F I D A V I T OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
1.

Party A p p e a l i n g :

Notice is hereby given

*

that
I hereby certify

that a true and correct copy of the

PLAINTIFF above-named hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals.
foregoing Notice of A p p e a l was mailed via United States M a i l ,
2.

Appeal is from the Judgment L Order

Judgment or O r d e r ;

iiist* c l a s s , postage prepaid on the j5fi*«4iay
i dated January

26, 1988, J u d g e , James S. Sawaya, Declining

Further

of
|j Jurisdiction

! mailed January 2 6 , 1988 however postmarked January
j:
!j counsel herein.

19

_J32L_™'

to

the

following:

Court Appeal From:

David M. W a l l , Esq.
The Atrium
2420 Enterprise Road, £204
Clearwater, FL
34623
Certified Mail IP717-949-001

2 7 , 1988 to
Blaine T. Hofeling
4329 Shirlev Lane
Salt Lake City, UT
84117
(U.S. Certificate of M a i l i n g )

i!
3.

-»

David S. D o l o w i t z , Esq.
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008
Certified Mail 0P717-949-OQQ

j| signed January 2 6 , 1988 and notice of same having been given to
I;
•• counsel by Minute Entry January 26, 1988 certifing that it was

i!

tis&eoAt&t

in the w i t h i n entitled case; said order having been

Appeal is taken from the Third

Ji
H District Court of Salt L a k e County, State of Utah,
j
4.
Appeal T o :
A p p e a l is taken to the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to its jurisdictional authority as set out
herein.

DATED t h i s

Authority
Rules of Practice in the District Court and Circuit
~^. tfoe state of U t a h ;

iff"
2fe*~
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Courts

Rule 2.9 "Written O r d e r s , Judgments & Decrees";
U.C.A.

77-35-3 R u l e 3 "Service & Filing of P a p e r s " ;

U.R.C.P. Rule 5 "Service and Filing of Pleadings
Papers"

Attorney

and O t h e r

R. Utah Ct. A p p . Rule 21 "Filing and S e r v i c e "
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Steven Lee Payton
431 South 300 East
Suite 40
Salt Lake City, Utah
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84111

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah
FILE NO.

TITLE:

r£, •

(• PARTIES PRESENT)
BLAINE THOiMAS HOFELING
-vs-

LAURA CATHERINE
WITOWSKI

(HOFELING)

COUNSEL.

D82-2587

W COUNSEL PRESENT)

: S t e v e n Lee

Payton

:
: David S.

Dolowitz

James S. Sawaya
HON..

January 26, 1988
DATE:

1/25/88

HEARD: Plaintiff's objection to order submitted by defendant.

The Court, having reviewed and examined orders submitted by
both parties, now determine^ that the order submitted by defendant is a
proper order reflecting the findings and Intent of the court.
signed and entered this date.

The order is

Plaintiff'supposed order is filed unsigned

ZL

/

I . A.. .«^o/^ i a w

%J/

FILED
M

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

AWi 1988^ Cf
'cAs^Vk, > ^ Z S L
Utah Court at Appc-ui

ooOoo
Blaine Thomas Hofeling,
Plaintiff and Appellant/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Laura Catherine (Hofeling)
Witowski,

Case No. 880151-CA

Defendant and Respondent.

Before Judges Garff, Jackson and Orme (On Law and Motion).
The motion of defendant-respondent Laura Catherine
(Hofeling) Witowski to dismiss the above-entitled appeal as
untimely, is granted^and the appeal is hereby dismissed. See R<
Utah Ct.* App^4(au)^and Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d) .
DATED t M s ^/ f
FOR THE COURT:

Regnal W. Garff,

day of March, 1988

'W

'\~/'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL by depositing the same in the United
States mail postage prepaid to the following:

Steven Lee Payton
Attorney at Law
431 South 300 East, Suite 40
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
David S. Dolowitz
Attorney at Law
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
525 East First South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT
84147-0008
Salt Lake County Court
Dixon Hindley, Clerk
Attn: LaDean Parker, Clerk
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this 1st day of April, 1988-

n
By

C/

^-v./
6v/'
Case Manager

»i »»MM''«MMi«

33iai] (ttouri of appeals
400 Mid town Plaza
230 South 500 East
*Ve City,
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Steven Lee Payton
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431 South 300 East, Suite 40
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[1] Each of these insurers should be regarded as standing in the shoes of its own
insured and as having the same rights and
liabilities as its insured has. Therefore, it is
appropriate to determine who would bear
the loss if no insurance existed.
[2] Under the common law, any liability
would be upon Mr. Johnson, the alleged
tort-feasor, and his insurer (Horace Mann)
would be obliged to step into his shoes and
defend him. However, the Public Employees' Indemnification Act has altered this.
In requiring public entities to protect their
employees from such losses by defending
and indemnifying them for claims arising
from activities within the scope of their
employment, except for acts of "gross negligence, fraud or malice," 2 the statute
shifts liability to the school district.
In addition to this shifting of liability
from the teacher to the school district, the
statute further specifically provides that if
the public entity (the school district here)
pays such a claim, the entity cannot seek
reimbursement from its employee (Johnson
here). 3 Those statutory provisions which
thus transfer responsibility for such a claim
from the employee to the school district,
and further provide that the district cannot
even obtain reimbursement from the employee, manifest a clear legislative intent
that it is the school district and not the
employee who must bear any such a loss.4
What protection the school teachers may or
may not receive from defendant Horace
Mann is not material here. But, it may be
of interest to observe that the latter's policy
does cover excess over that insured by
plaintiff Gulf and perhaps other matters
excepted by the statute.
On the basis of what has been said above,
it is our conclusion that the trial court
2.

GLAD ii. GLAD

567 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Sec. 63 4g-5, U.C.A.1953. "(1) Except as
provided in subsection (2) of this section, if a
public entity pays all or part of any judgment
based on or a compromise or settlement of the
claim against itself or an officer or employee,
the officer or employee is not liable to indemnify ihe public entity for this payment. (2) If the
public entity pays all or part of any judgment
based on a claim against itself or an officer or
eniplo\ee, the public entity may recover the
amount ot such payment it it is established that

correctly ruled that it is the school district
and its insurer plaintiff Gulf Insurance
Company, which are obligated to defend
and respond on l>ehalf of the teacher, Russell Johnson.
Affirmed.
dent).

Costs to defendant (respon-

ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.

Aria Jean GLAD, now Aria Jean Segmiller, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Harvey Lowell GLAD, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 14894.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 8, 1977.

Order to show cause was obtained by
divorced wife to enforce support provisions
of second divorce decree. The ex-husband
moved to dismiss the order for lack of jurisdiction and wife moved to dismiss first divorce case and vacate its decree on ground
of reconciliation. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, Sr.,
J., granted husband's motion to dismiss, determining decree in initial case had become
final, and wife appealed. The Supreme
Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) husband's
the officer or employee acted or failed to act
due to gross negligence, fraud, or malice."
3.
4.

Ibid.

Utah
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See subsection (I) above.

St Paul Ins Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co, 2J1
N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1975); Bridewell v. Board of
Education, 2 M.App.3d 684. 276 N.L.2d 745
(1971).

timely motions objecting to findings and
conclusions suspended all proceedings as to
first decree until court disposed of it and,
since motion was merely stricken from calendar and not heard on its merits, there
was not a final disposition and consequently
the first divorce did not become absolute;
and (2) second decree which parties abided
by without any attack was valid and absolute and supported wife's order to show
cause.
Judgment of dismissal of order to show
cause reversed, case remanded for hearing
thereon.
Crockett, J., concurred in result, but
dissented in part and filed opinion.

HALL, Justice:
Appeal from an order of dismissal of an
order to show cause filed in the District
Court of Salt Lake County.

The Glads were parties to a contested
divorce action wherein findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce were
entered on April 23, 1973. Three days later
defendant filed a document entitled "Notice" which was duly served upon plaintiff
advising of a hearing date of May 14, 1973,
on defendant's objection to the said findings, conclusions and decree claimed therein
to be contrary to the court's order and
minute entry. On the date scheduled for
the hearing of said objections neither party
appeared and on the court's own motion the
objections were stricken from the calendar.
Defendant does not challenge the validity
1. Divorce o=> 150.2
Ex-husband's timely motions objecting of the pleading entitled "Notice" as being
to findings and conclusions susj>ended all
also an objection, and in fact refers to it as
proceedings in divorce case until court dis- such.
posed of it and, since motion was merely
Some three months later the parties lived
stricken from calendar and not heard on its together for a time without re-marrying
merits, there was not a final disposition and
and after a further time Mrs. Glad again
consequently the divorce did not become
filed an action for divorce, making no referabsolute.
ence to the prior decree, and obtained a
second decree by default. Over two years
later Mrs. Glad sought and obtained the
order to show cause in question attempting
to enforce the support provisions of the
second degree. It was heard by the same
trial judge that granted the second decree
and when the facts concerning the first
3. Time <a=>9(8), 10(9)
decree surfaced Mr. Glad moved to dismiss
Although order api>ealed from was en- the order to show cause for lack of jurisdictered on October 28, 1976 and notice of
tion and Mrs. Glad moved to dismiss the
appeal was filed on November 29, appeal
first case and vacate its decree on the
was not untimely, in view of rule excluding grounds of reconciliation. The court grantday of act from any designated time period
ed Mr. Glad's motion to dismiss determining
and excluding last day of period if it falls the decree in the initial case had become
on Sunday. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
final. On appeal Mrs. Glad assigns as error
6(a).
(1) the court's refusal to dismiss the first
case and thus rentier the decree in the
second case a valid, final decree, and (2)
Leland S. McCullough, McCullough &
failing to support its ruling with findings of
McCullough, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
fact and conclusions of law.
and appellant.
The rules provide for amendment of a
Quentin L. R. Alston, Salt Lake City, for
judgment on motion of a party made not
defendant and respondent.

2. Divorce <s=>243
Where divorce decree was two years
old and parties abided by it without any
attack thereon, the decree was valid and
absolute and supported order to show cause
to enforce its support provisions.

162
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later than 10 days after entry of judgment, 1
and the divorce statutes provide that a decree shall not become absolute until the
expiration of three months from the date of
entry and not then if an appeal or other
proceedings for review are pending. 2

[3] Defendant asserts that the appeal
should be dismissed as not being timely and
in support thereof points out the order ap
pealed from was entered on October 28,
19*^6, and that the notice of appeal was filed
on November 29, 1976, more than one
month after the entry of said order.* Rule
6(a), U.R.C.P. is dispositive of this point in
providing for the computation of time that
the day of the act, event, or default after
which the designated period of time begins
to run is not included. Also, if the last day
of the period falls on Sunday it is not"
included and such was the case here. Consequently, the appeal was timely filed.

The foregoing have been previously interpreted by this court. In Spencer v. Clark3
the defendant in a divorce proceeding filed
a motion to set aside the findings of fact
and conclusions of law for the reason that
they did not conform to the testimony adduced at trial. The court determined that
the motion prevented the divorce from becoming absolute until the statutory period
(then six months) had elapsed after the
motion was disposed of.
A similar result was reached in Boucofski
v. Jacobsen4 wherein the power of a court
to modify its findings was recognized and
further noted that the time for appeal begins to run from the date the additional
findings or conclusions are made and entered, not from the date of the original
judgment.
[1] We again hold that a timely motion
setting forth objections suspends all proceedings until the court disposes of the
same and that since the motion was merely
stricken from the calendar and not heard on
its merits, such was not a final disposition
and consequently the first divorce did not,
and has not as yet, become absolute. Having so ruled, it is not necessary to treat the
further assignments of error, nor is it necessary to reverse the trial court's refusal to
dismiss the first case.

The judgment of dismissal of the order to
show cause is reversed and the case is remanded for hearing thereon. No costs
awarded.
ELLETT, C. J ,
WILKINS, JJ.

and MAUGHAN and

CROCKETT, Justice: (concurring in result, but dissenting in part).
I concur in the holding that the Order To
Show Cause was issued on a valid judgment
(the so-called Second Decree) and that it
should not have been dismissed. But, I
have some observations which I regard as
of sufficient importance to record.

[2] The second decree, being some two
years old, and the parties having abided by
it without any attack thereon, jurisdictional
or otherwise, we hold to be valid and absolute and properly supportive of the order to
show cause dismissed below.

I do not see the necessity for the dictum
that the filing of the "notice" or "objection"
to the findings in the first divorce case, and
leaving it undisposed of, would necessarily
have the effect of preventing a divorce
from becoming final. Nor do I believe that
such a ruling is in conformity with sound
policy or with our Rules of Procedure.
Whatever effect it may have had here,
there was something relating to the marital
status between these parties that could be
and was adjudicated by the Second Decree
That was done; and for the reasons stated
above and in the main opinion, that judgment stands as valid and unassailed.

1.

Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

5.

2.

Section 30 3 ?. U.C.A.I953.

3.

54 Utah 83, 179 P. 741 (1919)

4.

36 I t a h 165, 104 P. 117 (1909).

Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P. provides the time within
which an appeal may be taken shall be one
month from entry of judgment on order appealed from.

My apprehension is about any notion that ter; and I therefore offer the suggestion
the mere filing of such a "notice," or a that the rules should be amended to provide
motion, and leaving it undisposed of, that if any such motion is not disposed of
within a reasonable time, say 60 or 90 days
whether designedly or inadvertently, would
prevent otherwise valid proceedings and de- after it is filed, it shall be deemed to be
crees thereon from ever becoming final. denied.
The multifarious mischiefs that might result in many of the thousands of divorce
decrees upon which people rely and go their
way, having children and accumulating
property, etc., are so obvious that I spare
extenuation thereon here.
It is my opinion that the language of Sec.
30-3-7, U.C.A.1953, that "the Decree of
GILLHAM ADVERTISING AGENCY,
Divorce shall become absolute at the expiINC., a corporation, Plaintiff and
ration of three months from the entry
Respondent,
thereof; unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending
v.
should be understood as meaning "an apRobert K. IPSON, dba Bonneville Racepeal or other proceedings" in the nature of,
ways, Defendant and Appellant.
or equivalent to, an appeal; and further,
No. 14843.
that an undisposed of motion does not reach
that dignity.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Supporting the conclusion I advocate is
July 12s 1977.
the fact that the effect of the filing of such
a motion (and other motions of similar character) is stated in Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P. that:
In action by advertising agency against
The running of the time for
racetrack operator for advertising debt, the
appeal is terminated by a timely motion
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
made pursuant to any of the rules hereinMarcellus K. Snow, J., granted summary
after enumerated
judgment in favor of agency and operator
Granting or denying a motion for judgappealed. The Supreme Court,.Ellett, C. J.,
ment under Rule 50(b),
held that oj>erator, by signing as president
Denying a motion under Rule 52(b) to
of corporation a written agreement coveramend or make additional Findings of
ing fees and setting time and conditions of
Fact, . . .
payment prepared after he had failed to
Motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend
pay advertising debt, made himself liable,
judgment; or denying a motion for a new
even if it had been an original obligation,
trial. [All emphasis herein added.]
where there was no such corporation of
But our rules do not provide for any other
which he was president.
effect of the filing of such motions.
Affirmed.
For the reasons above stated, I do not
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opinagree with and therefore exclude from my
ion in which Wilkins, J., concurred.
concurrence the statement that "a timely
motion setting forth objections suspends all
proceedings until the court disposes of the
1. Corporations <s=>653
same." I think the rule should be that it
Where racetrack operator personally
does only what the statute and the rules
above referred to say; that it extends the leased racetrack and personally conducted
time for appeal. I appreciate that there is racing activity, advertising debt was |>era basis for difference of view on this mat- sonaily his and not that of his Nevada cor-

468 Uuh

626 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

GILROY v. LOWE

Utah

469

Cite as, Utah,;.626 P 2 d 469

striking "a balance between the interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public service it performs through its employees." 18
In the present case the interest of the State
corresponds to the education of its pupils
which is the primary objective of the school
district.
Rather than contradicting this interest
•the free expression of educational approaches and responsible criticism of school
programs by employees of the school district facilitates the effective performance
of public education. As long as the employee does not violate established policies of
the school district responsible statements
concerning those policies should not be curtailed and represent constitutionally protected speech. 19

Likewise, the fact the remedial meetings
between Mr. Elwell and Superintendent
Goodworth were made public does not interfere materially with the efficiency of the
public services performed by the school system. The interests of Mr. Elwell and the
public's right to be informed, outweigh the
relatively insignificant effect this disclosure
would have on the already inconsonant relationship between the principal and the superintendent. 21 Therefore, notwithstanding
the factual questions surrounding the disclosure of this information, Elweli's alleged
disclosure of the fact that remedial meetings were in progress falls within the constitutional protections of free speech and
cannot be relied upon as a basis for termination.22

Because constitutionally protected activities cannot constitute cause for termination,
the ultimate findings of insubordination
Therefore, El well's statements and posi- must be supported by the remaining
tions concerning the middle school concept charges presented by the March 7th and
cannot be relied upon by the Board to sup- June 4th letters and evidence in support
port his termination. 20 However, this was thereof. In the present case, the letter of
specifically listed in Goodworth's letter of June 4th indicates that the cause for ElMarch 7, 1977, under charge number 2, as weli's termination was insubordination.
one example of Elweli's wilful failure and
Thus, before we can decide whether the
refusal to follow the policies of the Board.
basic facts are supported by substantive
Similarly charge number 4, that El well adevidence and whether those basic facts reamitted that he had not supjx>rted Board
sonably support the inferred ultimate fact
policies cannot be relied upon as cause for
of insubordination that term must be
termination.
defined.
18. See Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v.
Doyle. 429 U.S. 274, 284, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574, 50
L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), (quoting from Pickering v.
Board of Education, 39 J U.S. 563. 568. 88 S.Ct.
1731, 1734. 20 LEd.2d 811 (1968)).
19. See Mt Healthy City Board of Education v.
Doyle, supra note 18, 429 U.S at 284. 97 S.Ct.
at 574; Bernasconi v. Tampa Elementary
School District No. 3, 548 F 2d 857 (9th Cir.
1977).
20. See Board of Trustees, Laramie County
School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo, 549 P.2d
1161, 1174 (1976) ("Cause may not be found in
a constitutionally-protected reason")
21. While co-worker harmony is a factor to consider in determining the breadth of constitutional protections to expression in this area,
that factor must be viewed in relation to the
content of the employee's statements and the
^^»
particular relationship in question See Picker• ^
ing v Bi>ard >>f Education, supra note 18. 391

^\

U.S. at 570, 88 S.Ct. at 1735. The mere act of
expression cannot be repressed by the dictates
of the employee's supervisor. As stated by the
Wyoming Supreme Court in Board of Trustees,
Laramie County School District No I v. Spiegel, supra note 20. 549 P.2d at 1176; ".
public school teachers may not be constitution
ally compelled, as a condition of retaining their
employment, to relinquish the First Amend
ment rights that they would otherwise enjoy as
citizens to comment on matters of public inter
est in connection, with the operation of the
public schools in which they work . . . "
22. Although the notice may have been released
in contradiction to Superintendent Goodworth's request, he has no more authority than
the school system itself to restrict Elweli's constitutionally protected rie.ht of free expression,
and his request to curtail that repression must
be seen as unreasonable and unauthorised.

Insubordination as grounds for the termination of an employment contract of a tenured educator has been defined as: " . . .
'constant or continuing intentional refusal
to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable
in nature, and given by and with proper
authority.'" n
While certain jurisdictions have held that
insubordination includes a wilful refusal of
a teacher to obey reasonable rules and regulations the better reasoned decisions place
emphasis on the presence of a persistent
course of wilful defiance.24 Therefore, in
the latter jurisdictions to constitute cause
for termination, it must be established that
the teacher embarked upon a persistent
course of wilful defiance. 25
Applying this definition, the basic facts
found by the Board would have to establish
a persistent course of wilful defiance by
Elwell before they could reasonably support
the ultimate fact of insubordination. The
evidence presented at the hearing in question does not substantially support the basic
facts required to establish a persistent
course of defiance. Therefore, no substantive evidence has been presented which can
reasonably support the ultimate finding of
insubordination. 24 While the evidence relates a variety of intermittent trivial acts in
variance with requests of the superintendent it does not detail any persistent defiance by Elwell. The intermittent infractions presented at the hearing are simply
too insignificant to justify the ultimate
sanction of non-renewal.
Also, the alleged findings of basic fact
outlined in the June 4th letter do not reasonably support an inference of insubordi23. Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Education, Special School District No. i, 295 Minn. 13, 202
N.W 2d 375, 378 (1972); (quoting from Shockley v. Board of Education, 51 Del. 537. 149 A.2d
331, 334, reversed on other grounds, 52 Del.
237. 155 A 2d 323 (1959)). Thus. Elweli's alleged refusal to comply with Goodworth's request not to disclose the reconstruction work
cannot support a finding of insubordination because the request was neither reasonable in
nature nor issued with proper authority
24. Board of Trustees of Weston County School
District No. 1 v. Holso. Wyo.. 584 P 2d 1009
(1978).

nation. Because that inference does not
follow reasonably from the alleged basic
facts presented after the hearing in the
June 4 letter, the Board's decision is arbitrary and capricious.27
Therefore, appropriate substantive review of the evidence in support of the
charges found in the June 4th letter would
require the decision of the Park City School
Board be overturned and the plaintiff reinstated to his previous position of employment. The majority's failure to undertake
any substantive review of this decision,
while accepting the letter of June 4th as the
Board's findings of fact, results in what I
believe is a critical emasculation of the
Utah Orderly Termination Procedures Act
and the perpetration of an injustice.

Frank K. GILROY, Plaintiff,
v.
Peter M. LOWE and Martha Lowe, his
wife, et al., Defendants and
Appellants,
Wendell L. Butcher et al., Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 16764.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 19, 1981.
Cross defendants appealed from the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho25. Id. at 1016.
26. See Gwathmey v. P. T Atkinson, 447
F.Supp. 1113 (E D.Vir.1976) See also Johnson
v. Branch. 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966); Johnson v. Butler, 433 F.Supp. 531 (W.D.Vir.1977);
Board of Trustees, etc. v. Holso, supra note 24,
584 P.2d at 1016.
27. Bogart v. Unified School District, No. 298 of
Lincoln County, 432 F.Supp.rfi»5(D.Kan 197 7).
Kruse v. Board of Directors of Lamom Community School District. Iowa. 2M N.W.2d t>26
(1975).
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nier F. Wilkinson, J., challenging an execution sale based on judgment rendered in
favor of cross plaintiffs and against cross
defendants. The Supreme court, Howe, J.,
held that: (1) sheriff was not prohibited
from carrying out execution sale because
cross defendants had filed and served a
declaration of homestead prior to the sale,
and (2) where judgment debtors had not
paid any portion of sizable judgment
against them and had not been subjected to
collection of it by the original judgment
creditor, any amounts recovered by the assignee apparently inured to the benefit of
assignors, and there was no claim of prejudice to cross defendants resulting from partial assignment or from execution sale
based on the assignment, partial assignment of judgment creditors' judgment to
assignee and execution sale held thereunder
were valid.
Affirmed.
1. Time e=>9<5), 10(6)
Execution sale on October 22, 1979,
which related to judgment rendered on October 22, 1971, was timely pursuant to rule
providing that a writ of execution may
issue at any time within eight years after
entry of judgment, in that day from which
time period is to run is excluded and the
same calendar date of the final month or
year is included when time period is measured in months or years from certain date,
and furthermore, even if limitations period
expired on October 21, 1979, that date was a
Sunday, and time period extended until the
end of the next day. Rules of Civil Procedure. Rules 6(a), 69(a); U.C.A.1953, 68-3-8.
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2. Homestead o=>66
Sheriff was not prohibited from carrying out execution sale of cross defendants'
home on ground that cross defendants had
filed and served a declaration of homestead
prior to its sale, in that cross defendants'
interest in home, $34,000, exceeded in value
the amount of the homestead exemption,
$8,000, and the assignee, which bid in $100,000 of the judgment against cross defendants, {.'aid to sheriff on behalf of cross d« -

fendants $8,000, the amount representing
homestead exemption. Const. Art. 22, § 1;
U.C.A.1953. 28^-1-1 et seq., 28-1-15.
3. Judgment <*=>920
Assignee of a portion of judgment
against cross defendants was entitled to
have execution issued, even though cross
defendants asserted that purported assignee of judgment creditors' judgment was
not, in fact, an assignee of judgment creditors' judgment, in that record provided ample support for finding that an assignment
was made from judgment creditors to the
assignee.
4. Judgment c=»836
A judgment may be assigned to someone who is not a party to the initial action,
and assignee receives the right to enforce
such a judgment.
5. Judgment <*=>838
Where judgment debtors had not paid
any portion of sizable judgment against
them and had not been subjected to collection of it by the original judgment creditors, any amounts recovered by assignee
apparently inured to the benefit of the assignor, and there was no claim of prejudice
to cross plaintiffs resulting from partial
assignment or from execution sale based on
the assignment, partial assignment of judgment creditors' judgment to assignee and
execution sale held thereunder were valid.
Richard J. Leedy, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellants.
Earl D. Tanner & Associates, J. Thomas
Bowen, Salt Lake City, for defendants and
respondents.

time of the sale; (2) the filing and service
of a declaration of homestead exempted
api>ellants' home from a sheriff's sale to
satisfy the judgment; and (3) the execution
sale was void because it was instituted at
the behest of an assignee of only a portion
of the judgment. 1
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The second issue raised by appellants is
that the sheriff was prohibited from carrying out the execution sale because appellants had filed and served a declaration of
homestead prior to the sale. A homestead
right is mandated by Article XXII, § 1,
Utah Constitution, 2 and further provided
for by §§ 28-1-1 et seq., U.C.A.3 As appellants view the homestead exemption in
light of its underlying policy, it is a complete bar to execution on a person's home
regardless of its value or the amount of
equity the judgment debtor owns in the
home. This interpretation, however, would
render meaningless the monetary limitations established by the Legislature to
define the homestead exemption.

[1] Rule 69(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a writ of execution
may issue at any time within eight years
after the entry of judgment. In this case
the judgment was rendered on October 22,
1971, and the execution sale took place on
Monday, October 22, 1979.
Appellants
characterize the time period between the
two events as eight years and one day.
They contend that the judgment lien was
extinguished on October 21, and that the
execution sale on the following day was,
therefore, invalid.
We disagree.
The
method of computing time periods relating
to acts provided for by law is set out "m
Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and. §§~68 3-7 and 8, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended. When the time period is measured in months or years from a certain
date, the day from which the time period is
to run is excluded and the same calendar
date of the final month or year is included.
See Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc.,
Utah, 596 P.2d 1025 (1979). Furthermore,
even if the limitations period expired on
October 21, 1979, that date was a Sunday,
and the time period extended until the end
of the next day. See Nelson v. Jorgenson,
66 Utah 360, 242 P. 945 (1926). The execution sale on October 22, 1979, was timely, as
was properly found by the trial court.

[2] The appellants in the present case
are entitled by statute to a homestead exemption in the amount of $8,000, based on
the legislative provision for $6,000 for the
head of the family and $2,000 for the
spouse. In their declaration of homestead
appellants stated the value of their home to
be $45,000, less the unpaid first trust deed
of approximately $11,000, for a net vaiue of
$34,000. The appellants' interest in the
home, therefore, exceeded in value the
amount of the homestead exemption. A
sale is not prohibited in these circumstances, but only when "the bid does not exceed
the value of the exemption, when the homestead is in one piece." § 28-1-15, U.C.A.4
The principle that a homestead property
may be sold when its cash value exceeds the
exemption has previously been recognized
by this Court. In Payson Exchange Savings Bank v. Tietjen, 63 Utah 321, 225 P.

1.

Although appellants raise additional issues in
their reply brief, these issues were not presented to the District Court and will not be considered for the first time on appeal.

2.

Article XXII. § I states. The Legislature shall
provide by law, for the selection by each head
of a family, an exemption of a homestead,
which may consist of one or more parcels of
land, together with the appurtenances and improvements thereon of the value of at ieast
fifteen hundred dollars, from sale on execution

HOWE, Justice:
This appeal challenges an execution sale
based on a judgment rendered in favor of
cross-plaintiffs Wendell L. and Irene B.
Butcher and against cross-defendants and
appellants Peter M. Lowe and Martha
Lowe, his wife, in the amount of $309,479.90. Appellants contend that the execution sale should have been set aside because
(1) the limitations period had expires! at the

Utah

Ctteas,UUh.re«P.2<i4«»

3.

§ 28 I 1 provides: A homestead consisting
of lands, appurtenances and improvements,
which lands may be in one or more localities,

not exceeding in value with the appurtenances
and improvements thereon the sum of $6,000
for the head of the family, and the further sum
of $2,000 for the spouse . . . shall be exempt
from judgment lien and from execution or
forced sale.
4. The inflationary increase in housing values in
recent years obviously dilutes the real protection afforded a homeowner by the statutorilyset dollar value of the homestead exemption.
It is for the Legislature, however, and not tor
this Court to determine the need for policy
implementation through changes in the law
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598 (1924), this Court stated that when a
claim of homestead is made a judgment
creditor is entitled to any excess above the
value constituting the homestead right.
See also Ostler Land & Livestock Co. v.
Brough, 111 Utah 336, 178 P.2d 911 (1947);
Giesy-Walker v. Briggs, 49 Utah 205, 162 P.
876 (1916). Cases cited by appellants deal
primarily with situations in which the
amount of the homestead exemption exceeded the value of the property and the
levy of execution of a homestead was found
to be void. See, e. g., Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614 (1937). Such
cases are not controlling here.
The homestead exemption is not a bar to
execution in the present case. Assignee
Federal Leasing, Inc., bid in $100,000 of the
judgment against appellants and paid to the
sheriff on behalf of appellants $8,000, the
amount representing appellants' homestead
exemption. The trial court ruled correctly
that appellants were not entitled to claim
the protection of the homestead exemption
to set aside the execution sale.
[3J Appellants' final point is that Federal Leasing, Inc.,5 which was the assignee of
a [>ortion of the judgment against appellants, was not entitled to have execution
issued in this action. This issue was
presented to the trial court in appellants'
motion to set aside the execution sale, dated
October 30, 1979, as follows:
This motion is made on the [ground] that
. . . Federal Leasing, Inc., the purported
assignee of Butcher's judgment is not, in
fact, an assignee of Butcher's judgment
The record, however, contains a document
entitled "Partial Assignment of Judgment,"
dated August 31, 1979, and signed by Wendell L. Butcher, assigning to Federal Leasing $100,000 of the judgment against appellants and "all sums of money up to $100,000

•

a

c-.

5.

FeieraJ Leasing. Inc.. is identified in respondents* brief as a corporation created as a result
of the divorce of Wendell and Irene B. Butcher.
It holds property in trust for their benefit.

6.

The record does not disclose whether in the
trial court the defendant raised the specific
issue ol the validity of an assignment of only a

that may be obtained by means thereof, or
in or as a result of any proceedings had
thereon." Federal Leasing was also given
power of attorney "to use all lawful means
for the recovery of the aforesaid money due
..."
A copy of the assignment was
presented to the sheriff at the time of the
execution sale, as stated in the affidavit of
J. Thomas Bowen, attorney for Federal
Leasing and Wendell L. Butcher, dated October 31, 1979. A copy of the affidavit was
mailed to counsel for appellants on October
31, 1979, several days prior to the hearing
on appellants' motion on November 9. The
record provides ample support for the finding that an assignment was made from
judgment creditor Butcher to Federal Leasing.
[4] Appellants challenge the propriety
of execution issuing at the direction of a
"stranger or interloper to an action," but
they cite no authority on this point. It is
beyond question that ordinarily property or
contract rights may be transferred to an
assignee. A judgment may be assigned to
someone who was not a party to the initial
action, and the assignee receives the right
to enforce such a judgment. See 46 Arn.
Jur.2d Judgments § 883 (1969); 49 C.J.S.
Judgments § 522b (1947).
Appellants further challenge the partial
assignment* as being invalid for being contrary to the "general rule" stated in 49
C.J.S. Judgments § 520 (1947) as follows:
As a general rule a partial assignment of
a judgment, while valid as between the
parties, is of no effect against the judgment debtor unless he consents thereto or
ratifies it.
This statement is grounded on several legitimate policy considerations.
A debtor
should not be subject to the annoyance or
harassment of collection efforts by diverse
and numerous creditors holding assignments of fractions of a single judgment.
portion of a judgment. Although we recognize
the soundness of the rule that issues may not
be raised for the first time on appeal, the assignment in this case was challenged by appellants in the court below, and we therefore address the partial assignment question

Nor should a judgment debtor be subject to
Forace MARTIN and Eldean Martin,
further liability to an assignee when he has
husband and wife. Plaintiffs and
without notice of the partial assignment
Respondents,
satisfied his obligation to the judgment
creditor either by full payment or by payv.
ment of a lesser stipulated amount. A "se- Herta K. DENNETT, Herta K. Dennett
cret" partial assignment may be unenforceas personal representative of John Elable also in situations where it would ad%ood Dennett, Deceased; EHas J. Robversely affect a third-party purchaser of
inson; Eliza S. Robinson; Western Savproperty on which a judgment lien existed.
ings SL Loan Company, as Trustee and
[5] This Court has not ruled on the vaas beneficiary; Interstate Brick Compalidity of a partial assignment of a judgment
ny; Bank of Salt Lake; Beneficial Life
and whether an assignee of a portion can
properly direct the sheriff to execute on the
Insurance Company, The United States
debtor's property. An early Indiana case
of America; The Industrial Commission
upheld an oral partial assignment and an
of Utah; The Tax Commission of Utah;
execution issued thereon, Wood v. Wallace,
Southeast Ready Mix and John Runyon,
24 Ind. 226 (1865), and in Madison & Pendba Colorado Development Company,
nings, Inc. v. Foundation Engineering Co.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Tex.Civ.App., 390 S.W.2d 48 (1965), the
No. 16781.
court recognized that it was permissible to
Supreme Court of Utah.
transfer only an interest in a judgment,
citing Great American Indemnity v. McMcnFeb. 19, 1981.
amin, Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.2d 734 (1939).
In the instant ca.se, the judgment debtor
had not paid any portion of the sizeable
Personal representative of decedent's
judgment against him and had not h*?en estate appealed from an order of the Third
subjected to collection efforts by the origi- District Court, Salt Lake County, Christine
nal judgment creditor. Any amounts re- M. Durham, J., which gave priority to fedcovered by the assignee, Federal Leasing, eral tax liens recorded prior to decedent's
apparently inured to the benefit of the as- death over claim made for reasonable fusignor. There is no claim of prejudice to neral expenses and expenses of administraappellants resulting from the partial assigntion of decedent's estate. The Supreme
ment or from the execution sale based on
Court, Stewart, J., held that the claims for
the assignment.
reasonable funeral expenses and expenses
None of the reasons usually advanced for of administration had priority over the fednot recognizing partial assignments are eral tax lien, in that the federal statute
here present, and we hold that under the which establishes the priority of tax claims
facts of this case, the partial assignment refers to estates of deceased debtors which
and execution sale held thereunder are val- cannot cover all the "debt due from the
id.
deceased," and statute thus accords priority
Affirmed. Costs to Respondents.
only to debts "due from the deceased" and
does not include debts incurred by the esMAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL, STEW- tate, and the state statute which grants
ART and CROCKETT,* J J., concur.
priority to funeral and administration expenses of an estate over debts of the deceased was controlling as to claims against
the estate.
Reversed and remanded.
• C H O C K L T t . J., a<t<*d on this case prior to his
retn c-mt'iii
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